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REHABILITATING THE "MYSTERY
PASSAGE": AN EXAMINATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S ANTHROPOLOGY
USING THE PERSONALISTIC NORM
EXPLICIT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
KAROL WOJTYLA
MICHAEL SCAPERLANDAt
Every notion of human liberty rests on an underlying
assumption about what it means to be human. In other words,
some theory about human nature and some hypothesis about the
person's origin, purpose, and destination are necessary to give
substance to the concept of liberty. To borrow from Wojtyla,
liberty is "within the domain of the person. It is impossible to
understand anything about it without understanding what the
person is, its mode of existence, its functioning, its powers."' The
shape liberty takes in a given society will depend on that
society's public anthropology. 2 If a given society has a good grasp
of human nature, if it understands the reality of the human
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1 KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 18 (1993) (referring to sexual
morality, which deals with a specific type of liberty).
2 See John Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What It Means to Be
Human from a Franciscan Perspective, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 609, 610 (2000) ("Every
system of law reflects certain foundational assumptions about what it means to be
human."). These can be referred to as "anthropological assumptions." Id.; see also
Michael Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An "Alien's" View of Tiered
Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing, Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55
CATH. U. L. REV. 5, 52 (2005); Michael Scaperlanda, Producing Trousered Apes in
Dwyer's Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175, 196 n.118 (2002) [hereinafter
Scaperlanda, Trousered Apes]; Michael Scaperlanda, Realism, Freedom, and the
Integral Development of the Human Person: A Catholic View of Education, 44 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2005) [hereinafter Scaperlanda, Realism].
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person, it has a firm foundation upon which to build a society
where free human beings can flourish. If, however, a society has
a flawed understanding of the human person, its concept of
freedom is likely to be flawed as well, giving rise to the very real
possibility that the 'liberty" it offers its denizens will lead to
their destruction or diminishment as human beings.3
Suspend disbelief for a moment and engage with
me in a simple thought experiment. Suppose one member of a
submarine crew gets an acute case of claustrophobia.
Subjectively, he intensely experiences an acute lack of freedom as
he is confined within a small tube with neither windows nor
privacy several hundred feet below the ocean surface. At wits
end, and with no thought of suicide, he opens a hatch to escape
his life-sustaining prison causing destruction to everyone aboard.
This person's subjective idea of freedom was at odds with the
objective order. In his gravely disordered understanding of
freedom, he exercised his will and took action in a way that
violated clear biological or material laws. In reality, his
claustrophobia diminished his capacity for authentic freedom as
his reason was subordinated to his senses creating a mirage-an
illusion-of freedom from his desperate feeling of suffocation. 4
At a basic level, freedom for the human person requires
recognizing and obeying the objective laws necessary for the
human organism's survival. At a more advanced level, freedom
3 See Scaperlanda, Trousered Apes, supra note 2, at 214-15 (noting that faulty
perceptions about reality-specifically, misunderstandings concerning the truth
about the human person-can lead to toxic judgments as the exercise of "misguided
compassion... remove[s] the human from its life sustaining environment"). In
Realism, Freedom, and the Integral Development of the Human Person: A Catholic
View of Education, supra note 2, at 89-90, I recount the story of a former
homecoming queen and cheerleader who left children behind to pursue the "free
life." "Homelessness, heroin addiction, and AIDS each unmasked her illusion" of
freedom. Id.
4 Other examples, although not leading to immediate death or destruction, are
equally clear. Take, for example, the case of the alcoholic who exercises his
"freedom" to continue drinking. In one sense he is free, but in another, deeper sense,
we know that he is a slave to his addiction and that continuing to drink will destroy
not only his physical health, but his mental, emotional, and spiritual health in
addition to the well-being of his family. Or, to take another example, we encourage
college-educable teenagers to graduate from high school and go to college. We
encourage them to exercise their freedom in a certain direction for their own good,
knowing that exercising "freedom" to seek immediate gratification out of youthful
rebellion or dislike of school will lead to their own destruction or diminishment.
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for the human person requires recognizing and obeying the
objective laws necessary for human flourishing.
In reaffirming Roe v. Wade,5 the United States Supreme
Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 articulated a vision of
liberty, embedding it in our constitutional framework, making it
a norm that is binding on our government institutions and
providing a culturally powerful sound bite for one vision of
liberty.7 It said: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life."8 And, as the Court made clear in
Casey, it is not just the right to define one's own concept of
existence, but the right to act on that definition. 9 Some dis-
missed what Justice Scalia has dubbed the "sweet-mystery-of-life
passage"10 as mere rhetorical flourish,1 but the Ninth Circuit's
Judge Reinhardt took it seriously, relying on it to hold that
Washington's ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional. 2
5 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
The Casey Court said it was not just interpreting our constitutional law, but
speaking before all others with respect to our constitutional ideals. Id. at 868 ("Their
belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional
cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's
legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to
see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not
for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.");
see also Richard Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1279 (2006) ("[W]e should think of the
Constitution as a partly aspirational document, embodying ideals that are not yet
and perhaps need not ever be fully realized but that remain constitutional ideals
nonetheless.").
8 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
9 In Casey, the Court upheld Roe's "essential holding" that a woman has a
constitutionally protected right to terminate her pregnancy. See id. at 846.
10 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 See Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 469, 525 (1998) ("[Slcholars have aptly argued that this passage must be
considered within the context of the plurality's entire opinion and its emphasis on
stare decisis. Within that context, the passage should be most accurately understood
as rhetorical and not as prescriptive of any specific rights.").
12 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). Relying on
the "mystery passage,"
The district judge in this case found the Court's reasoning in Casey
"highly instructive" and "almost prescriptive" for determining "what liberty
interest may inhere in a terminally ill person's choice to commit suicide."
We agree.
Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how
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When the Supreme Court ignored Reinhardt's reasoning and
decided that a person did not have a constitutional right to define
himself out of existence through assisted suicide, 13 it looked as
though the mystery passage would be of marginal legal
and cultural significance. 14 But, the mystery passage reappeared
in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas15
providing a cultural/legal foundation for the decision to strike
down Texas' ban on homosexual sodomy.16
This "mystery passage" is the public "creation story" given to
us by the high priests of American law. I call it a "creation story"
because an implicit anthropology-an implicit understanding of
what it means to be human-underlies this view of liberty.' 7
Specifically, it might be called a "self-creation" story because it
proposes that human beings are creatures capable of creating
themselves-pursuing their own life's ends-and worthy of such
an endeavor. In this essay, I will examine the Court's "creation
story" and attempt to tease out its underlying anthropology.' 8
and when to die is one of "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime," a choice "central to personal dignity and
autonomy." A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full
measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and
humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a
childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a
person dies not only determines the nature of the final period of his
existence, but in many cases, the enduring memories held by those who
love him.
Id. at 813-14 (citation omitted).
13 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 (1997) (addressing Casey's
mystery passage, the Court found "[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions
are so protected ... and Casey did not suggest otherwise").
14 See, e.g., Lynn Marie Kohm & Colleen Holmes, The Rise and Fall of Women's
Rights: Have Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom Forfeited Victory?, 8 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 381, 402 (2000) ("[T]he Court distanced itself from this language in
Casey, and the mystery passage in particular.... As Glucksberg demonstrates, the
Court is clearly uncomfortable with its broad definition of liberty.").
15 539 U.S. 558 (2002).
16 Id. at 574.
17 See Richard W. Garnett, "Everlasting Splendours:" Death-Row Volunteers,
Lawyer's Ethics, and Human Dignity, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS:
CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW 254, 272 (Michael Scaperlanda &
Teresa Collett eds., forthcoming 2007) (referring to Casey as an "autonomy-centered
anthropology"). Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), each have their own anthropological foundations, the
exploration of which is beyond the scope of this essay.
18 As of April 28, 2006, there were 58 articles on Westlaw that mentioned the
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Where found wanting, I will attempt to rehabilitate it using the
personalistic norm developed in Karol Wojtyla's philosophy and
expressed in his book Love and Responsibility.19 If the Court has
an adequate understanding of the human person, then its
creation story will provide a firm basis for protecting the liberty
of individuals from the power of the state. 20 If, however, the
Court's anthropology is faulty, its idea of liberty is likely to be
faulty, possibly in dangerous ways. Since it is purporting to
speak for all Americans and for the foundation of our common life
together, the consequences of getting it wrong (or right)
reverberate throughout society.
Is the mystery passage an adequate creation story upon
which to base our nation's concept of liberty? At first blush,
there is much to recommend the Court's view because it
recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, four fundamental truths about
the human being. First, it understands the vital importance of
liberty for the human condition, recognizing that the inner
structure of the human being yearns for freedom. 21 To a large
"mystery passage." For expanded reading on the "mystery passage," see Francis J.
Beckwith & John F. Peppin, Physician Value Neutrality: A Critique, 28 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 67, 69, 72 (2000); Gerard Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 189, 200-03 (2004); John M. Breen, Justice
and Jesuit Legal Education: A Critique, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 383, 407-08 n.108
(2005); Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death
Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 555-56 (2003); William K.
Kelley, Inculcating Constitutional Values, 15 CONST. COMM. 161, 178-79 (1998);
Stephen B. Presser, Some Thoughts on Our Present Discontents and Duties: The
Cardinal, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Unborn, the Senate, and Us, 1 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 113, 113-15 (2003); Charles Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral
Limits, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 259, 272-73 (2005); Patrick Shrake, Griswold at 40:
The State's Compelling Interest in Banning Contraceptives, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
475, 487-88 (2005); John Tuskey, What's a Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence
v. Texas and the Right to Sexual Autonomy, 21 TOURO L. REV. 597, 613-32 (2005).
19 WOJTYLA, supra note 1; see also ROCCO BUTTIGLIONE & KAROL WOJTYLA, THE
THOUGHT OF THE MAN WHO BECAME POPE JOHN PAUL 11 (1997); JOHN PAUL II, MAN
AND WOMAN HE CREATED THEM: A THEOLOGY OF THE BODY (2006) (providing an
extended theological meditation on the same subject); KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING
PERSON (1979).
20 The question of whether it is proper for the judiciary to enforce (create?)
unwritten constitutional norms is beyond the scope of this paper. For my thoughts
on the issue, see Michael Scaperlanda, In Defense of Representative Democracy, 54
OKLA. L. REV. 38, 38-45 (2001).
21 This point may be too obvious to footnote, but I thought it interesting that an
April 27, 2006 search on Amazon's website revealed more than 150 not-yet-released
books listed under the broad subject of "freedom" and over 17,000 books in print
addressing this subject.
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extent, the story of the Twentieth Century, the story of World
War II and the Cold War, is the story of the struggle for freedom
against those who would enslave, oppress, and tyrannize. 22 At
the heart of the human person is the desire for freedom. Second,
this recognition of the importance of liberty, coupled with the
Court's willingness to attempt to protect the individual's liberty,
represents an implicit recognition that the human person has an
objective value, a dignity as a person, worth protecting and
preserving.23 Third, it recognizes that human beings, in the
exercise of their freedom, yearn for meaning-yearn for answers
to life's ultimate questions. 24  Fourth, the Court seems to
recognize a certain personal and subjective dimension to the
answers, understanding that a person will define himself by his
own answers to these questions.
The Supreme Court appears to have gotten a lot right in
articulating a creation story to express the "heart of liberty. '25
Reason and experience testify to these four fundamental truths:
human beings possess a dignity that requires respect; essential
to this respect is freedom or liberty for the human being; in
freedom the human being will search for answers to life's
ultimate questions; and the human being will fashion his life-
create himself-around the answers that he has found to those
questions. But, is the Court's story of self-creation complete? Is
it adequate? Or, does it have serious flaws, which endanger the
whole enterprise? I will argue that the Court's anthropology, its
story of self-creation, is incomplete, leading the Court into
serious error about the nature of freedom.
22 See generally GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE
JOHN PAUL 11 (2005).
23 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitution has come to
earn the high respect and even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration of
the American people. The document sets forth, and rests upon, innovative
principles original to the American experience, such as federalism; a proven
balance in political mechanisms through separation of powers; specific
guarantees for the accused in criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure
individual freedom and preserve human dignity. These doctrines and
guarantees are central to the American experience and remain essential to
our present-day self-definition and national identity.
Id. at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 See, e.g., VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 84 (2000).
25 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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Although the Court's creation story implies an objective
basis upon which to build its case for the "heart of liberty," the
Court a) fails to articulate the basis for its objective view of the
human being, and b) fails to analyze the subjective liberty of the
individual to self-create in light of the objective foundation for
that liberty. It asserts that the person must be free to pursue her
own ends based upon her own conception "of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."26
But why? Who or what is the human being to be entitled to
respect and dignity? Who or what is the human being to be
entitled to a certain space to take the stuff of her existence and
create a life unique to herself? At one level it is an obvious
untruth to suggest that we create ourselves by our own
conception of existence.27 We did not conceive ourselves into
existence. We found ourselves in existence, and we found our-
selves with a certain capacity to wonder about our existence, its
origin, purpose, and destination. Either some supernatural
intelligence created us or we are the product of the blind
processes of nature. We didn't ask to come into existence, and we
didn't choose the parents, the culture, or the circumstances in
which we were raised. We didn't choose our IQ or our level of
athletic ability. To a great degree we are not in control of our
lives, although we create great myths to give us the illusion of
control. And, unless we choose suicide, which is not among the
judicially protected constitutional liberties, we do not choose our
own final earthly end. I would also venture to guess that if we
surveyed all the cultures throughout history, the idea that each
and every human being has an inherent dignity that must be
respected by the state and that this respect requires a certain
amount of space for self-creation, would be held only by a distinct
minority of cultures.
Given this objective material and historical reality, what or
who is the human person that he is entitled to dignity, respect,
and freedom? The Court doesn't answer the question; in fact, it
doesn't even ask the question. Instead, it merely assumes that
26 Id. at 851.
27 See, e.g., WOJTYLA, supra note 1, at 222-23 (stating that "[tihe concept
'creature' denotes a special form of dependence" on that which brought the creature
into "existence ('to be created' means 'to depend for one's existence')"). This leads to a
paradox: The human person "is at once his own property (sui juris) and as a
creature, the property" of that creative life force that brought him into existence. Id.
at 223.
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the human being has an inherent dignity, which requires respect
for the individual's subjective freedom, 28 but it doesn't tell us why
this is true. In other words, the Court's creation story is
incomplete because it divorces the pursuit of personal, subjective
ends from the objective reality of the person. Self-creation is not
and cannot be the whole of the matter. But, without going back
further in time and deeper into the person to ask and answer the
"why" question, the Court's attempt to develop a thick conception
of the individual's liberty rests on a very thin and unstable
conception of the individual. Three consequences flow from the
Court's failure to fill in the rest of the blanks in its creation story.
First, without a firm foundation, dignity and freedom-the
very things that the Court wants to protect-are on precarious
ground, threatening the long-term prospects for the whole
enterprise of securing liberty for the individual. This problem
may not manifest itself in a way that most people will notice in
the near term because our culture still employs the term "human
dignity" with great frequency, and liberty remains one of our
cherished concepts. But, in the long term, the failure to root
liberty and dignity in an explicitly-articulated objective reality is
bound to have consequences. 29 Without a firm foundation rooted
in objective truth, we are like frogs in a pot of water as the
temperature slowly rises to the boiling point.
Second, the Court will not consistently apply the principle
enunciated in the mystery passage. It will not exercise its power
to protect the right of each person to act on his own subjective
definition of "existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."30 The Court will exercise some form of
judgment to conclude that some other goals or some other goods
trump some exercises of liberty some of the time. Potentially, the
Court could employ the "harm principle," allowing each person to
freely pursue his own self-defined ends so long as that person
does not visit nonconsensual, 31 tangible, and concrete harm on
28 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
29 See, e.g., GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE,
AMERICA, AND POLITICS WITHOUT GOD 108-14 (2005) (attributing "the depradations
of the French Reign of Terror, Nazism, and communism" to "radically secularist
understandings of the human person, human community, and human destiny" in
modern secular European states, in contrast to the Catholic Church's robust
commitment to democratic freedoms).
30 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
31 Consensual harm ought to be protected under the Court's purely subjective
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another.32  Setting aside the problem of determining what
constitutes harm, the Court has not followed this path to date.
Ignoring Casey's mystery passage, the Court, in Washington v.
Glucksberg, said that other goods, articulated by the state,
trumped the liberty to seek and receive assistance in committing
suicide, despite the fact that no tangible or concrete harm would
befall a nonconsenting person.33
Because it has failed to articulate the objective basis upon
which to build its concept of liberty, the Court lacks an adequate
criterion for deciding when the state has the authority to restrict
a person's exercise of liberty in the name of some other good.
Without an explicit objective understanding of the human person
that can give the Court guidance as to what goods ought to be
understanding of the heart of liberty, provided sufficient safeguards are in place to
ensure that the person harmed fully and freely consents. After all, one's "concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life," might
involve receiving or inflicting harm. Id. at 851.
32 The "harm principle" maintains that:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1859); see, e.g., Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reviving a Natural
Right: The Freedom of Autonomy, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 125, 125 (2006). Lawrence
fears that the autonomy generated by following the "harm principle" is under attack
today.
America in the early twenty-first century is a place where oppressive state
constitutional amendments discriminate against millions of gay Americans;
where compassionate end-of-life choice is illegal in 49 states and where the
one state where it is legal is being sued by the U.S. government; where
hundreds of thousands are arrested yearly and tens of thousands are in
prison for private possession or use of marijuana and the federal
government successfully sues to prevent a state from allowing the use of
medical marijuana; where a woman's right to maintain control over her
own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where religious freedom
is under relentless attack.
Id.
33 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723, 725-27 (1997). In other
areas where the "harm principle" would suggest juridical abstinence, it seems
unlikely that the Court will interfere with state choices to protect goods other than
autonomy. For example, I doubt that the Supreme Court would overturn helmet
laws to allow the motorcycle Zen Master the freedom to ride his motorcycle with his
locks flowing in the wind. Cf. ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE
MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES 3 (HarperCollins 1999) (1974). It also
seems unlikely that the Court would seriously entertain a challenge to animal
cruelties laws despite the fact that animals are not rights-bearing creatures.
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pursued independent of an individual's own desires, the Court
will be hardpressed to explain adequately why actions based
upon some conceptions of "existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life"34 are worthy of protection while
others are not. Reading the mystery passage's logic into the
Court's substantive due process cases, it becomes apparent that
the Court carves out a space for self-creation most often in
matters dealing with sex and the consequences of sex. 35 By what
criterion does the Court find these values worthy of the
protection while other values are not?
Third, the harmful consequences of a liberty rooted purely in
the subjective desires and preferences of the rights-bearer with
no foundation in objective truth have been clearly established in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Building on Casey, the
Court, in Stenberg v. Carhart,36 upheld the right to terminate the
life of what is undeniably an innocent human being-a child in
the process of being born.37  District Judge Richard Casey
characterized partial-birth abortion as "a gruesome, brutal,
barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure." 38 Stenberg, Justice
Scalia concluded, is not "a regrettable misapplication of Casey,"
but the "logical and entirely predictable consequence" of that
decision. 39
I have identified three problems with the Court's anthro-
pology as expressed in the mystery passage: it lacks an explicit
objective foundation, it lacks a criterion for judging when the
34 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
35 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578-79 (2003) (adult homosexual
conduct); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54
(1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-43 (1972) (distribution of
contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-83 (1965) (access to
contraceptive information and materials for married couples).
36 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
37 See id. at 920-22, 937-38; John Breen & Michael Scaperlanda, Never Get
Out'a the Boat: Stenberg v. Carhart and the Future of American Law, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 297 (2006).
38 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see
also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, J.,
concurring) ("[The Carhart Court] effectively held that the deeply disturbing-and
morally offensive-destruction of the life of a partially born child cannot be banned
by a legislature without an exception for the mother's health (as determined by her
doctor)."); id. at 312 (Straub, J. dissenting) ("I find the current expansion of the right
to terminate a pregnancy to cover a child in the process of being born morally,
ethically, and legally unacceptable.").
39 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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individual's pursuit of her own subjective ends ought to be free of
state control, and these first two problems have led the Court to
sanction a "gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized" practice
in the name of liberty. The problems with the mystery passage
can be resolved-its "creation story" rehabilitated-by
completing the story and putting it on an objective basis. 40 In
this essay, I suggest that the personalist norm, which is at the
heart of Karol Wojtyla's philosophy, can guide the way to a firm
foundation.
What is the human being? Why does it have a dignity
worthy of respect? Why does this respect require liberty-space
for the individual to pursue her own subjective ends? Wojtyla
begins his analysis by noticing that in the world of objects, the
human being is a "somebody" and not a "something. 41 "Implicit
in this simple, elementary distinction is the great gulf which
separates the world of persons from the world of things."42 He
continues: "The term 'person' has been coined to signify that a
man cannot be wholly contained within the concept 'individual
member of the species', but that there is something more to him,
a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his
being. ... "43 The individual human being is a "person" or a
"somebody" because "he is a rational being," an object with "the
ability to reason."44  This makes the person a unique subject
in all the world of subjects. As Wojtyla says, "[s]peaking
figuratively, we can say that the person as a subject is
distinguished from even the most advanced animals by a specific
inner self, an inner life, characteristic only of persons."45  He
continues:
Inner life means spiritual life. It revolves around truth and
goodness. And it includes a whole multitude of problems, of
40 Rehabilitating the mystery passage is no panacea. The basic institutional
question-does the Court have constitutionally-granted authority to enforce un-
written norms?-remains. And, the interpretative task (whether or not it includes
unwritten norms) will at times be difficult even when applying a rehabilitated
anthropology.
41 WOJTYLA, supra note 1, at 21.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 22.
44 Id. "Hence Boethius's famous definition of a person as simply an individual
being of a rational nature (individua substantia rationalis naturae). This
differentiates a person from the whole world of objective entities, this determines the
distinctive character of a person." Id.
45 Id.
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which two seem central: what is the ultimate cause of
everything and-how to be good and possess goodness at its
fullest. The first of these central problems of man's interior life
engages cognition and the second desire or, rather, aspiration.
Both of these functions, though, seem to be more than that, to
be rather what might be called natural tendencies of the whole
human entity. Significantly, it is just because of his inner
being, his interior life, that man is a person, but it is also
because of this that he is so much involved in the world of
objects, the world 'outside'.... 46
This leads Wojtyla to conclude: "A person is an objective entity,
which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole
(external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely
because of its inwardness, its interior life."47
The Supreme Court's anthropology, its story of the right to
subjective self-creation, implies that the human individual has
inherent dignity. Here, Wojtyla supplies the basis for that
conclusion. This basis provides an objective foundation for the
proposition that the person ought to be free, that the human
person has an inalienable right to liberty. Wojtyla develops the
argument by noticing that it is inherent in "the nature of his
being" for the person to strive "to assert himself, his 'I'" in the
world around him.48 The human person's "nature .... includes
the power of self-determination, based on reflection, and
manifested in the fact that a [person] acts from choice. This
power is called free will."49 A subject that "possesses free will" is
in some sense "his own master."50 As Wojtyla says:
The Latin of the philosophers defined it in the assertion that the
personality is alteri incommunicabilis-not capable of
transmission, not transferable.... The incommunicable, the
inalienable, in a person is intrinsic to that person's inner self, to
the power of self determination, free will. No one else can want
for me. No one can substitute his act of will for mine. It does
sometimes happen that someone very much wants me to want
what he wants. This is the moment when the impassable
frontier between him and me, which is drawn by free will,
becomes most obvious. I may not want that which he wants me
46 Id. at 23.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 23.
49 Id. at 23-24 (distinguishing our nature further from that of animals).
50 Id. at 24. "[S]ui juris as the Latin phrase has it." Id.
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to want-and in this precisely I am incommunicabilis. I am,
and I must be, independent in my actions. All human
relationships are posited on this fact. All true conceptions about
education and culture begin from and return to this point.51
Like the Court, but on a clearly articulated objective basis,
Wojtyla holds that persons as persons must be free to pursue
their own subjective ends. And, like the Court, he knows that
the ends pursued will be directed by explicit or implicit answers
given by the person to life's ultimate questions, the "mystery of
the universe" questions. As pope, he framed it this way: the
"questions .... Who am I? Where have I come from and where
am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this
life[,] ... have their common source in the quest for meaning
which has always compelled the human heart."52  And, "the
answer given to these questions decides the direction which
people seek to give to their lives."53
But a problem immediately arises. Human beings are not
only subjects, but also objects of action.54 "At every step acts
occur which have, as their object, other human beings." 55 Given
the inherent dignity of each and every person, what are the
obligations of "Person A" toward "Person B" when "Person B" is
an object of the acts of "Person A?" "Is it permissible to regard a
person as a means to an end and to use a person in that
capacity?" 56 Wojtlya's answer is an emphatic no. In Love and
Responsibility, he makes this point by reformulating Kant's
imperative:
[W]henever a person is the object of your activity, remember
that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end,
as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too,
has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends. This
principle, thus formulated, lies at the basis of all the human
51 Id.
52 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ETRATIO 1 (1998).
These are the questions which we find in the sacred writings of Israel, as
also in the Veda and the Avesta; we find them in the writings of Confucius
and Lao-Tze, and in the preaching of Tirthankara and Buddha; they appear
in the poetry of Homer and in the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles, as
they do in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle.
Id.
53 Id.
54 See WOJTYLA, supra note 1, at 24.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 26.
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freedoms, properly understood, and especially freedom of
conscience. 57
The personalistic norm can be stated in both the negative
and the positive. "[Iln its negative aspect," the norm "states that
the person is the kind of good which does not admit of use and
cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an
end."5  Stated positively, the "norm confirms this: the person
is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude
is love."59  And, "love for a person must" at least "consist in
affirmation that the person has a value higher than that of an
object for consumption or use."6 0 This, Wojtyla says, is a matter
of justice, because "[a] person's rightful due is to be treated as an
object of love, not as an object for use."6 1  This type of love,
Wojtyla argues, "depends on [a person's] willingness consciously
to seek a good together with others, and to subordinate himself to
that good for the sake of others, or to others for the sake of that
good."62  In a simplified example, he gives the case of an
employer-employee relationship, suggesting that inherent in that
relationship,
is a serious danger that the employee may be treated as a mere
instrument.... If, however, the employer and employee so
arrange their association that the common good which both
serve becomes clearly visible, then the danger of treating a
person as someone less than he really is will be reduced almost
to nothing.63
57 Id. at 28.
58 Id. at 41. In his conclusion, but for very different reasons, Wojtyla follows
Kant. See MICHAEL WALDSTEIN, INTRODUCTION, IN JOHN PAUL II, MAN AND WOMAN
HE CREATED THEM: A THEOLOGY OF THE BODY 52 (2006) (quoting Kant's
Groundwork of Morals) ("Act in such a way that at all times you treat human nature
in your own person as well as in the person of every other human being
simultaneously as a purpose, never as a means."). Waldstein's Introduction explores
Kant's influence on Wojtyla's thought. Id. at 34-63. "In the end, however, [Wojtyla]
stands Kant on his head, based on his Carmelite personalism and his richer
understanding of nature." Id. at 63 (stating that Wojtyla embraces an integral
personalism, rejecting Kant's dualistic understanding of the human being).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 42.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29.
63 Id. For an attempt to live out these principles in the corporate context, see
Philip Preville, For God's Sake, CANADIAN Bus., June 25, 1999, at 58 (noting the
tools that J. Robert 0uimet, a successful Canadian businessman, has instituted in
his factories to ensure better lives for his employees, and, as a result, increased
productivity).
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This brings us back around to the problem with the "mystery
passage," the story of self-creation as told by the Court. Taken at
face value, the Court seems to be saying that society ought to
leave a person alone to determine for himself a hierarchy of
values and to pursue his own private ends based on these values,
with the possible proviso that he cannot exercise his ends to
inflict tangible and concrete harm on another. This leaves the
person completely free to pursue purely utilitarian ends if the
person concludes that the meaning of life is to maximize
pleasure. But, as Wojtyla says,
[i]f I accept the utilitarian premise I must see myself as a
subject desirous of as many experiences with a positive affective
charge as possible, and at the same time as an object which may
be called upon to provide such experiences for others. I must
then look at every person other than myself from the same point
of view: as a possible means of obtaining the maximum
pleasure.64
The critical point is that
utilitarianism introduces into [human] relationship[s] a
paradoxical pattern: each of the persons is mainly concerned
with gratifying his or her own egoism, but at the same time
consents to serve someone else's egoism, because this can
provide the opportunity for such gratification-and just as long
as it does so. This paradoxical pattern.., means that the
person-and not only 'the other person', but the first person
too-sinks to the level of a means, a tool. There is an
ineluctable, an overwhelming necessity in this: if I treat
someone else as a means and a tool in relation to myself I
cannot help regarding myself in the same light.65
By choosing to pursue his own subjective utilitarian ends,
the individual is denying his own personhood, the objective basis
for his dignity and freedom, and the personhood of those he
would exploit, whether by consent or not. In short, he is acting
unjustly toward himself and his neighbor.
"Justice is universally recognized as a cardinal and
fundamental virtue, since without it human beings can have no
ordered communal life."66 Therefore, society, through education,
the development of culture, and, in appropriate places, through
64 WOJTYLA, supra note 1, at 37.
65 Id. at 39.
66 Id. at 245.
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law, 67 has a right to "demand from a person, as a thinking
individual, that his or her ends.., be genuinely good, since the
pursuit of evil ends is contrary to the rational nature'of the
person."68 Since "the personalistic norm lays down the rights of
the person,"69 at a minimum, the state ought to be free to
promote this norm, which provides the objective basis for the
freedom to pursue one's own subjective ends. In promoting this
norm, the state may, at times, deem it prudent to proscribe
certain behaviors that violate this norm.70 The state, through its
lawmaking bodies, should be free to do so without judicial
interference, unless the law would violate a specific
constitutional provision.
This analysis points toward the conclusion that embedded
within the structure and logic of the "mystery passage" is an
inherent limitation on the use and direction of freedom. It is
unjust to use another person merely as an object for one's own
pleasure, as a tool for one's own project, or as an instrument for
one's own ends. The Court's recognition that a person's dignity
includes the liberty "to define one's own concept of existence"71
and to pursue her own ends based upon that definition cannot
justly include a constitutionally protected liberty to use another
human being instrumentally. This is so because the subjective
right to self-definition rests upon the objective value of the
human person. To sanction the instrumental use of one person
by another is to deny the objective value of that person, thereby
destroying the very thing the Court says is "at the heart of
liberty."72
To put its vision of liberty on firm footing, the Court must
make explicit the objective basis for the subjective right to self-
create. Although there is much to be gained by putting its
jurisprudence on an objective basis, such a move comes at a cost.
67 The extent to which law ought to be used as a tool to encourage or command
goodness is beyond the scope of this essay.
68 Id. at 27. "This is also the purpose of education, both the education of
children, and the mutual education of adults; it is just that-a matter of seeking
true ends, i.e. real goods as the ends of our actions, and of finding and showing to
others the ways to realize them." Id; see also id. at 196-97 (noting the importance of
one's self-mastery and control).
69 Id. at 245.
70 The prohibition of assisted suicide is one recently-litigated example. E.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
71 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
72 Id.
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After all, recognizing objective truth about the human person
and the nature of freedom requires subordinating subjective
preferences and desires to the objective reality. This is easily
seen in the material world of gravity and oxygen. The desire to
exit a submarine, a spaceship, or an airplane must be
subordinated to an objective material reality, with gratification
delayed until such time as the environment surrounding the craft
is hospitable to human life. The same logic applies equally to the
nonmaterial world. Freedom must be ordered toward truth.
Therefore, to consciously embrace the objective basis for
protecting the person's freedom to pursue subjective ends
requires the Court to respect the truth about the person and
about freedom. It is beyond the scope of this short essay to
review the panoply of ways that this might affect the Court's
jurisprudence, but let me suggest that at least some of the cases
granting a sexual license would have to be rethought because
much of the sex that the Court has licensed over the last few
decades violates the personalistic norm. In other words, even
though much of the sex licensed by the Court takes place
between consenting adults and causes no tangible or concrete
harm as defined by a utilitarian ethic, it harms the participants
in their very personhood, because each treats the other as an
object for one's own sensual or sentimental pleasure. 73 Or, at
least that is what I glean from popular culture by watching
movies, sitcoms, dramas, and commercials. Perhaps there is
some other arguable objective basis upon which to build the right
to subjectively self-create that comes without this cost to judicial
precedent, but I have not seen it.
73 A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this essay. Sex for merely
recreational or relaxation purposes is a clear example:
I want to experience sexual pleasure and want to use you and your body as
the object by which I reach sexual gratification. As the price for this
experience, I am willing to become an object, a thing, for your use so that
you too may achieve sexual satisfaction.
In this all-too-common situation, neither party treats the other as a subject, a person
valuable in his or her own right, but merely as a tool for maximizing one's own
personal pleasure. Without a committed relationship between persons, and when the
cost of obtaining pleasure from the other rises past a certain point, the relationship
will be ended, the other discarded, so that the person can go seek less costly
alternatives to pleasure.
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